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Abstract
We propose a new model of simultaneous price competition, based on rms
o¤ering personalized prices to consumers. In a market for a homogeneous good
and decreasing returns, the unique equilibrium leads to a uniform price equal
to the marginal cost of each rm, at their share of the market clearing quantity.
Using this result for the short-run competition, we then investigate the long-
run investment decisions of the rms. While there is underinvestment, the
overall outcome is more competitive than the Cournot model competition.
Moreover, as the number of rms grows we approach the competitive long-
run outcome.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we take a fresh look at markets where the rms compete in prices
to attract consumers. This is an elemental topic of industrial organization that
has been thoroughly investigated, ever since the original contribution of Cournot
(1838).1 Our excuse for re-opening the case is that we o¤er a fundamentally new
way of modelling price competition, which naturally leads to a unique equilibrium
with price equal to (perhaps non constant) marginal cost. The innovation we propose
is to allow the rms the option to personalize their prices. Note that we are NOT
assuming that they can engage in rst-degree price discrimination, as they need
not know the valuation of each consumer. Nonetheless, as we explain below, the
exibility allowed by personalized pricing ensures that competition is cut-throat even
in situations where attracting too much demand is harmful (because of increasing
marginal costs).
In the remainder of this Introduction we give a brief overview of the most relevant
literature in three subsections. We then present our model in detail. Section 3
derives the short-run equilibrium, while Section 4 looks at the long-run consequences.
We conclude with a brief discussion of our results.
1.1 Deconstructing the Bertrand Paradox
Take the standard model of simultaneous price competition between two producers
of a homogeneous good at constant and identical marginal cost, commonly referred
to as the Bertrand duopoly. As it is well known, this model has a unique equilibrium,
where both rms price at marginal/average cost, thereby earning zero prot. While
the model itself seems realistic, the result is clearly not: even though there are only
two competitors, they have no market power at all.2 The literature has dealt with
1Yes, Antoine-Augustin Cournot, not Joseph Bertrand. While Cournot (1838) only discussed
quantity competion for the more salient case of substitute goods, he did formalize price competition
as well, for the case of perfect complements.
2As a result, if entry to the market is costly or there are xed production costs as we would
expect in a duopoly they have no incentive to enter. This sounds paradoxical: how can we have
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this issue enriching the model, by including product di¤erentiation, price-quantity
bidding or dynamic competition. While the generalized models are useful in their
own right, it is nonetheless conceptually relevant to note that actually nothing is
amiss in the basic model.
Recall that if the technology is of increasing returns to scale that is, average
costs are decreasing in output then we have a natural monopoly: there is room for
only one rm in the market. The paradoxical situation with constant marginal
cost is the limiting case of this, where two (or more) rms can justt. When
returns to scale are actually decreasing that is, average costs are increasing and
so marginal costs are above average cost as we will discuss below in detail, rms
do make positive prots in the Bertrand duopoly, despite still pricing at the cost of
the marginal unit sold in equilibrium.
The immediate implication is that the seemingly innocuous simplifying as-
sumption of constant returns actually leads to a non-generic, knife-edge situation,
just between the cases where a duopoly can make prots or losses. Therefore, it
should not come as a surprise that constant returns lead to zero prots in oligopoly:
there is no paradox. Thus, we need not modify the strategic aspects of the original
game to endow the rms with market power: it su¢ ces to observe that marginal
costs are likely to be increasing in oligopoly.
1.2 A detour
The traditional approach toward the resolution of the Bertrand Paradox pioneered
by Edgeworth (1897) has been to allow rms to choose the quantity they are willing
to sell at the price they set. In its pure form, this leads to an Edgeworth Cycle,
or, in modern parlance, a mixed strategy equilibrium (c.f. Levitan and Shubik,
1972): Even if the equilibrium is unique, the range of prices o¤ered are large3 and
an operating market where rms cannot recoup their investments?
3For example, when demand is Q = 1  p, and cost is quantity squared, with the proportional
rationing rule proposed by Edgeworth, prices would oscillate between 1/2 (the competitive price)
and 2/3.
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the two rms generically set di¤erent prices. Allowing rms to set supply functions
(complete quantity-price schedules) does not eliminate severe multiplicity either (c.f.
Klemperer and Meyer, 1989).
Building on the insights gained from the analysis of Bertrand competition with
capacity constraints by Levitan and Shubik (1972), Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)
constructed a two-stage model where rms rst commit to capacity levels (or simply,
produce prior to the realization of demand) and then price competition follows. The
remarkable outcome is that in the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium prices and
quantities (produced and sold) are the same as those that would result in a one-shot
Cournot competition. Unfortunately, Davidson and Deneckere (1986) showed that
this result is not robust to the choice of rationing rule: Kreps and Scheinkman used
the e¢ cient or surplus-maximizing rule, where the demand is served starting
from the highest valuation buyer. As this rule results in the most pessimistic residual
demand curve for a rm with the higher price, for any other rule the outcome is
more competitive than the Cournot equilibrium.
Looking at competition from the long-run perspective is indeed insightful and it
is the main contribution of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). However, restricting the
xed factorto be a choice of capacity is not only unnecessarily restrictive but it is
also somewhat misleading. The latter weakness comes from the undue prominence
capacity choice gives to rationing. Allowing for the chosen cost curve to be smooth,
avoids rationing altogether as the rms are able to supply within reasonable limits,
see below the entire demand, even if they wished not to.4
1.3 Decreasing returns
Let us re-examine the Bertrand duopoly under diseconomies of scale. As shown by
Dastidar (1995), increasing marginal costs are not the panacea either as they lead
to multiple equilibria. There exists a range of prices, such that if a rm charges one
4Boccard and Wauthy (2000/2004) look at an extension of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) where
the capacity can be voluntarily exceeded, at a linear cost.
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of them the others best response is to charge the same price.5 Denoting demand by
D(:) and cost byC(:), the lowest equilibrium price, p, is where the sellers splitting the
demand6 just break even: pD(p) = 2C(D(p)=2). The highest one, p, is where serving
the entire demand gives the same prot as splitting it: pD(p) C(D(p)) = pD(p)=2 
C(D(p)=2). The reason for this plethora of equilibria lies with the obligation of a
deviant rm to serve all comers at the announced price. With constant marginal
costs this is not an issue. However, when marginal costs are increasing, selling to
the entire market what happens if a rm undercuts its competitor may not be
an advantageous proposition. Raising the price above the competitors does not pay
either as the residual demand is nil. Thus, with deviations discouraged, equilibria
thrive.
In order to regain a unique equilibrium price, Dixon (1992)7 introduced a mod-
ied Bertrand-Edgeworth game, where together with their price the rms also an-
nounce a maximum quantity they are willing to sell at it. This trick resolves
Dastidars problem that downward deviations are too costly, and by having rms
commit to supply if needed more than their share in the competitive equilibrium,
it removes the incentive for rivals to increase their price above the competitive one
(residual demand is zero), thus destroying the Edgeworth Cycle.
In this paper, we wish to enrich Dixons model by allowing the rms to make
a personalized price o¤er to each consumer. There are a number of reasons for
proposing this.
 Firstly, in some applications especially Internet commerce, where via cookies
sellers can price discriminate the option of posting personalized prices is more
realistic.
 Second, from the game-theoretic point of view, our strategies are (nearly) a
5The indeterminacy of this result is rather severe. For instance, if demand is Q = 1 p, and cost
is quantity squared, the lowest and highest equlibrium prices are p = 13 and p =
3
5 : The monopoly
price would be 34 , the Cournot price
3
5 (it is just a coincidence that it equals p).
6Dastidar assumes equal sharing of the demand for rms charging the same price.
7See Allen and Hellwig (1986) as well.
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generalization of Dixons. If we restrict attention to price schedules that take
only two values, a su¢ ciently high one, at which no one buys, and an "interior"
price, then such price schedules are equivalent to a single price and a maximum
quantity.8 Thus, Theorem 1 below shows that the larger strategy set does not
lead to a di¤erent equilibrium price (and neither does it destroy the existence
of a deterministic equilibrium price), while it also implies Dixons result.
 Third, from a conceptual point of view, we feel that despite being a semi-
generalization of Dixons model, ours is closer in spirit to pureprice compe-
tition, as quantities are not explicitly mentioned, and no consumer faces the
risk of being rationed.
 Fourth, our model leads to a decentralized implementation, where each con-
sumer decides individually which price to accept in equilibrium, so there is
no need to appeal to sharing rules9 and to an invisible hand clearing the
market.
 Finally, as our rms do not have nite capacities (self-imposed or otherwise) 
for a high enough cost they can satisfy the market demand our equilibrium
is not hostage to an exogenous choice of rationing rule.
2 A model of price competition
Specically, we assume that there is a set 
 of N producers, indexed by J =
1; 2; :::; N , with increasing, strictly convex, twice di¤erentiable costs functions, CJ(q),
with C(0) = 0, and there is a unit mass of consumers, indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. Each
consumers valuation, v 2 [0; 1], is an i.i.d. draw from the strictly increasing and
8Except that the quantity has the names of a subset of consumers on it, which only enriches
the set of possible outcomes.
9Dixon (1992) assumes equal sharing, though he also assumes that all rms have the same cost
function. In fact, it is straightforward to see from the proofs of his Lemmas 1 and 2 that with
asymmetric costs and equal sharing, his model generically has no equilibrium. To regain existence
the sharing rule must be in proportion of competitive supply, see below.
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continuous probability distribution function F (v), resulting in a deterministic ag-
gregate demand function D(p) = 1   F (p) : [0; 1] ! [0; 1]. We assume that rms
do not observe individual buyer valuations (however, see Remark 2 below). Firms
simultaneously set a (Lebesgue measurable) price schedule, PJ(i) each, which as-
signs to each consumer a (personalized) price. Consumers observe their N o¤ers
and accept at most one of them. As long as it is feasible, rms are committed to
satisfy the demand of each consumer that accepts their o¤er (see Remark 1 below).
Outside options are normalized to zero.
We denote the inverse of rm Js marginal cost function its price-taking supply
function by SJ(p), and dene the competitive price, p, as the price that equates
aggregate supply with demand : D(p) =
PN
J=1 SJ (p
).
The following corollary shows that p is a selection from Dastidars interval.10
The corollary also highlights a key observation that is useful in comprehending the
intuition for our main theorem below: price is below (above) the marginal cost 
that would result by selling the competitive share of the demand at that price if
and only if it is less (more) than p. That is, there is a pressure to move towards
the competitive price from any symmetric hypothetical equilibrium. To simplify
matters, we make the following regularity assumption, which basically requires that
a rms residual demand according to the Vives Rule is non-increasing in the price
(the second derivatives of the cost functions are not too di¤erent):
10The exact description of the latter (especially its lower bound), depends on whether there are
xed costs of production (for simplicity we assume not: C(0) = 0) and on the rule according to
which rms charging the same (lowest) price split demand. For consistency with our endogenously
derived result below, we adopt the assumption made by Vives (1999) see Dastidar (1997) as well
that they split in proportion to their price taking supply (SJ(p)): rm Js share as a proportion
of the aggregate output if rms in   set the lowest price (p) is J(p;  ) =
SJ (p)P
K2  SK(p)
. With this
assumption, the result is straightforward (see Vivesnote 7 in Chapter 5), as by construction 
in equilibrium all rms must produce.
An interesting alternative assumption as it reduces the complexity of the consumersstrategies
could be to assume that the split is according to the competitive supplies at p no matter what
the price is: J(p;  ) =
SJ (p
)P
K2  SK(p
)
. In this case, as well as with xed costs, it can happen that
in the lower price equilibria some of the rms are excluded from production.
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Assumption 1 For all J; p and  , d[J (p; )D(p)]
dp
 0. Equivalently, dJ
dp
 p
J

 dD
dp
 p
D(p)
, or "(SJ)  "(K2 SK)   "(D).
Corollary 1 The competitive price is in the Dastidar interval: p < p < p. More-
over, if Assumption 1 is satised, then for every J; p >=< p () p >=< C 0J(J(p;
)
D(p)).
Proof. The lowest Dastidar equilibrium price is the lowest commonly charged price
where all rms make non-negative prots. As at the competitive price they all have
the same marginal cost (p) which is above average cost (as C(0) = 0 and C 00 > 0)
p < p: The highest Dastidar price is the highest commonly charged price at which
no rm would prefer to serve all the demand. As at the competitive price they all
charge at marginal cost, any additional amount sold would decrease their prots,
implying that p < p: To see the second observation, note that by Assumption 1
and the convexity of C(:), C 0J(J(p; 
)D(p)) is a curve non-increasing in p: Thus,
it crosses the (strictly increasing) line p from above at p. Consequently, when
p >=< p, p >=< C 0(J(p; 
)D(p)).
3 The short-run equilibrium
The main result of this section is that assuming that it is feasible for any N   1
rms to serve the demand at p our decentralized price setting mechanism leads
to the competitive outcome.
Before presenting this, a technical point. When a continuum of agents each
ramdomize over a common nite set of actions, there is no guarantee that the set
of agents that choose certain action (in this case, accepting trading with seller J) is
measurable. If such set is not measurable, then payo¤s and best responses cannot
be dened. In order to avoid what is but a technical issue, we will consider only
equilibria where this indeterminacy is not an issue.11
11In fact, the concept of "equilibrium" implicitly requires measurability of outcomes.
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Thus, let P = (P1; P2; :::; PN) represent the vector of sellersstrategies. Also,
let i represent consumer is (mixed strategy), where i = (1i ; 
2
i ; :::; 
N
i ) and 
J
i :
RN ! [0; 1] with PJ  1 represent consumer is probability of accepting Js o¤er
given the price o¤ers PJ(i) for J = 1; 2; :::; N . We can nally represent by  the
strategies of all consumers, and dene
J(i;P;) = 
J
i (P1(i); P2(i); :::; PN(i)):
as the probability that consumer i accepts seller Js o¤er when sellers and consumers,
respectively, use the strategy prole (P;). We say that the outcome of (P;) is
measurable if for each J , J(i;P;) is (Lebesgue) measurable in i. Equivalently, ifZ
i
J(i;P;)di
exists for all J .
Theorem 1 As long as CK

SK(p
)D(p)
D(p) SJ (p)

< 1 for all K 6= J ,12 the unique mea-
surable equilibrium outcome in pure price schedules is such that all trades are at the
competitive price and rms sell in proportion to their competitive supply: rm Js
o¤er of p is accepted by a measure SJ(p) of consumers.
The proof is in the Appendix.
Remark 1 The symmetric equilibrium strategies involve o¤ering the good for the
competitive price to all consumers (who then use a mixed strategy of acceptance in
proportion to the rmscompetitive supply). Thanks to the Law of Large Numbers,
this is not any more serious an issue than in Dixons model, as a unilateral deviation
can only move the demand from SK(p) to
SK(p
)D(p)
D(p) SJ (p) , which by assumption (both his
and ours) is still feasible. In practical terms, following a deviation by a competitor a
rm would prefer to ration consumers. There must be either su¢ cient reputational
concerns or consumer protection regulation in place to ensure compliance.13
12One can replace innity by any other number that determines the limit of feasibility (like the
bankruptcy constraint in Dixon, 1992).
13This may involve a substitute good or a rain check. The crucial assumption is that a
consumer who has accepted an o¤er no longer has unsatised demand in the market.
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Remark 2 Note that, if we assume that consumer valuations are observable, our
mechanism allows rms to perfectly price discriminate. Theorem 1 would still apply:
marginal cost pricing continues to be the equilibrium outcome, so competition drives
out price discrimination. Unlike in the case of monopoly, the lack/presence of the
ability to price discriminate has no e¢ ciency consequences.14
4 The long run
Now that we have a unique prediction for the outcome of Bertrand competition in
the short run, we can turn to the question of the choice of  or investment in 
productive technology, which was considered to be xed in the short run.15
We assume that all rms have access to the same meta-technology, described by
the di¤erentiable, sub-additive production function f(K;L) which satises fK ; fL >
0, fLL; fKK  0, and fKL > 0. Here K, say capital, priced at r, is considered to be
the xed factor while L, say labor, priced at w, is the short-run decision variable.
WhenK is xed, the production function results in a cost function CSR = wL(q;K),
where L(q;K) is the short-run input demand for L implicitly dened by
f(K;L(q;K)) = q: (1)
Di¤erentiating both sides with respect to q we obtain fL  L0(q) = 1, implying
that MCSR(q) = wL0(q) = w
fL
. Di¤erentiating with respect to K, we have that as
required at any given quantity, marginal cost is reduced by investment:16
@MCSR(q)
@K
=  fKL  w
f 2L
< 0: (2)
14This is in contrast to Armstrong and Vickers (1993) but in line with Holmes (1989) and Stole
(2007).
15Cabon-Dhersin and Drouhin (2014) look at a similar two-stage model, but they use Dastidars
(1995) model of price competition in the second stage, which they then rene by selecting the
collusive (highest price) equilibrium.
16If we di¤erentiate with respect to q and L; we can also verify that the cost function is indeed
convex, as assumed in the previous section.
10
Thus, rms have an incentive to sink capital into their technology. We model the
long-run competition as follows: In a rst stage, rms simultaneously choose their
xedinputs, KJ ; J = 1; 2; :::; N , in anticipation that in a second stage this will be
followed by the play of the "Bertrand equilibrium" identied in the previous section.
Given the choices of all other rms, K J , rm Js best response solves
max
KJ

p(K J ; KJ)SJ(p(K J ; KJ))  CSR(SJ(p(K J ; KJ));KJ)  rKJ
	
: (3)
The rst-order condition for this maximization problem is
@p(K J ; KJ)
@KJ

SJ(p
) +
 
p  MCSR (SJ(p);KJ)

S 0J(p
)

= r+
@CSR (SJ(p
);KJ)
@KJ
:
(4)
As we have discussed in the previous section, p = MCSR(SJ(p);KJ), so the above
condition simplies to
@p(K J ; KJ)
@KJ
 SJ(p) = r + @C
SR (SJ(p
);KJ)
@KJ
: (5)
This leads to the following immediate result.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium all rms will underinvest, not only relative to the
rst best but even conditional on their equilibrium output.
Proof. Note that for a given quantity-price pair, at the cost minimizing mix of K
and L,  @CSR
@KJ
= r. Thus, at any e¢ cient mix of inputs, the left-hand side of (5)
has the same sign as @p

@KJ
: We will show that @p

@KJ
< 0, implying that in equilibrium
0 > r + @C
SR
@KJ
. In other words, an extra unit of capital would decrease short-term
costs by more than its price, just as claimed in the proposition.
Recall that in short-run equilibrium
X
I 6=J
SI(p
) = D(p) SJ(p). Totally di¤er-
entiating both sides with respect to KJ we obtainX
I 6=J
@SI(p
)
@p
 dp

dKJ
= D0(p)  dp

dKJ
  @SJ(p
)
@p
 dp

dKJ
  @SJ(p
)
@KJ
: (6)
Solving for dp

dKJ
we have
dp
dKJ
=
@SJ (p
)
@KJ
D0(p) 
X
I
@SI(p)
@p
: (7)
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CQ
MCLR
ACLR
MCSR
ACSR
By (2) @SJ (p
)
@KJ
> 0. Moreover, we have established already that marginal costs are
increasing and thus @SI(p
)
@p
> 0 for all rms. The fact that demand is downward
sloping completes the proof.
Note that Proposition 1 points to an e¤ect beyond the hold-up problem. It is
not that rms restrict investment because they will not reap its full benet. Rather,
there is a market power e¤ect: taking into account that the nal price decreases in
their investment, the rms have an additional reason to invest too little in capital.
Note that this implies that the short-run marginal cost is strictly larger than the
long-run marginal cost for the equilibrium level of output. (See graph.)
That is, even though the price equals the short-run marginal cost, the equilibrium
is not e¢ cient: the price is larger than the long-run marginal cost (market power
e¤ect) and rms do not minimize costs (cost ine¢ ciency).
4.1 Cournot or not, revisited
We can now check what our two-stage model has to say in the discussion of whether
the (long-run) Cournot model is a good description of a market where rms rst take
decisions that a¤ect output, and which they take as given when they set their prices.
In the standard Cournot model, when rms choose their inputs, in particular their
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level of K, they do so taking as given not only their competitors(conjectured) level
of K but also their (conjectured) level of output. We could equivalently formalize
this problem in two steps: rms choose their level of K, and then, without observing
anything else, they choose their level of L and so their output. This emphasizes that
the only di¤erence between the Cournot model and our two-stage model is that,
when choosing K, as in (3), in the Cournot model rms would conjecture that 
since choices are not observed their choice of capital does not directly a¤ect their
competitorsquantity choices: dqI
dKJ
= 0, and so @Q
@KJ
= @qJ
@KJ
. This means that in (6)
the left-hand side 
X
I 6=J
dSI(p
)
dKJ
is zero, so that in terms of price responses this is
equivalent to conjecturing that dp

dKJ
=
@SJ (p
)
@KJ
D0(p)  @SJ (p)
@KJ
instead of
@SJ (p
)
@KJ
D0(p) PI @SI (p)@p , and
thereby to overestimatingthe (negative) e¤ect of investment on the market price.
Now, return to our two-step model, and assume for a moment that rm J makes
exactly the same conjecture, i.e., that dqI
dKJ
= 0, while qI , I 6= J , are xed at the long-
run Cournot output. Obviously, in that case, rm J would also choose the Cournot
output and the e¢ cient mix of inputs by solving (4). However, compensating for the
overestimate of the negative e¤ect of investment, the left-hand side of (4) becomes
positive, showing that at that level KJ is too low. Thus, in our equilibrium KJ is
larger than in the long-run Cournot solution. As the short-run Cournot production
is increasing in K, even a second-stage Cournot competition would lead to higher
production. Finally, it is easy to see that the short-run competitive output is always
higher than the short-run Cournot one. Thus we have shown that
Proposition 2 In the two-stage long-run equilibrium with price competition, pro-
duction is higher than in the one-stage long-run equilibrium with quantity setting.
Proposition 2 means that the Cournot output is an overestimation of the market
power that oligopolistic rms enjoy. This is consistent with Davidson and De-
neckeres (1986) critique of Kreps and Scheinkmans (1983) rendering of rst long-
run quantity, and then short-run price competition. However, our result is not based
on the plausibility of one or another rationing rule, but rather on a basic strategic
interaction taking into account input substitutability. Once we depart from the
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(implicit, in Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983, and Davidson and Deneckere, 1986) as-
sumption of a xed proportion production function, rms take into account how
their input decisions a¤ect those of their rivals, and this is what makes them behave
more aggressively than predicted by the Cournot model.
4.2 Discussion
Price competition should lead to marginal cost pricing even when rms enjoy market
power. Price competition is perhaps the best description of market behavior in the
short run, and so we should expect that the price is indeed close to the marginal
cost of rms. However, we have been familiar with the distinction between long
and short run since the days of our rst college studies of Microeconomics. Certain
decisions, input decisions in particular, are mostly taken as given, when prices are
chosen, as Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) argued. Fixed production factors typically
result in decreasing returns even when the technology is constant returns in the long
run. Thus, marginal cost pricing and extraordinary prots are compatible. What is
important to understand is not so much the di¤erence between price and (short-run)
marginal cost, but the incentives for the choice of levels and mix of inputs and as
a result, the level of output arising from the strategic considerations present when
rms do have market power: when rmsdecisions a¤ect market output and price.
This is the main message of this paper. We have shown how these strategic
considerations typically lead to both an ine¢ cient mix of inputs, with long-run
decisions resulting in too low levels of these long-run determined inputs; and result
in prices above long-run marginal cost.
We have also shown that, from a long-run point of view, and as argued by
Davidson and Deneckere (1986), (short-run) price competition results in more output
than predicted by the Cournot model. According to our analysis, the discrepancy
comes from the strategic interaction between the long-run decisions of the di¤erent
rms. When a rm determines its own short-run cost function by investing in the
long-run factor of production, it takes into account how these decisions will a¤ect
14
future output decisions of rivals. A lower short-run marginal cost will be answered by
rivals with a reduction in their own output. Thus, investments in these production
factors have a lower impact on prices than what is predicted by the Cournot model.
The result is a stronger incentive on short-run cost reduction and therefore, a larger
output.
Despite this stronger incentive to invest in the long-run factor, the equilibrium
input mix shows ine¢ ciently low levels of it. As we have shown, this is associated
with the e¤ect of the long-run factor on prices, and is a well-understood phenomenon
in price competition: at the cost minimizing mix of inputs, a small reduction in the
use of the long-run input increases the equilibrium price. When marginal units are
sold at marginal (short-run) cost, this e¤ect dominates the second order e¤ect on
cost minimization.
Both the departure from the e¢ cient mix of inputs and the departure from long-
run marginal cost pricing are, therefore, consequences of market power. Indeed,
from (2) if symmetric rms behave symmetrically and there are N active rms in
the market,
 @p@KJ  < 1N 1 . Thus, as N gets large @p@KJ approaches zero and, by (5),
the input mix approaches e¢ ciency. Moreover, market clearing (and e¢ cient input
mix) implies output per rm approaching 0, at which point long-run marginal cost
equals short run marginal cost (and then price).17
17This is not an artifact of our assumption of always increasing average cost, and so marginal
cost of 0 at q = 0. Indeed, assume more standard, "U-shaped" average cost in the long run, and
dene the minimum e¢ cient scale
q = arg min
q
fC(q)
q
g:
Let p = C(q
)
q , i.e., the average cost at that level of output. If
N =
D(p)
q
is large, as N approaches N, market clearing and e¢ cient input mix implies output per rm
approaching q, at which point, again, long run marginal cost equals short term marginal cost and
so price.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have presented a novel way of modelling price competition, which
leads to marginal cost pricing but positive prots as the unique equilibrium,
without the need to specify rationing (when demand exceeds supply) or sharing
(when supply exceeds demand) rules. It should therefore be a useful o¤-the-shelf
workhorse model to embed in more complex scenarios.
We have also developed the most direct implications in a set-up with long-run
competition, underlining the consequences of market power as ine¢ cient investments
in the xed factor. This analysis has also shed more light on the literature on two-
stage Bertrand-Edgeworth competition.
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6 Appendix
Proof. (of Theorem 1) First, we show that charging p to (almost) everyone is
indeed an equilibrium. Suppose that consumers use a mixed strategy of acceptance
such that if they receive the lowest o¤er, p; from the rms in  , they probabilistically
accept them in proportion of the rmscompetitive supplies at p: they accept rm
Js o¤er with probability J(p;  ):
Assume all rms but J make a price o¤er p to all consumers, and consider
the best response of rm J : PJ(:): Let Q1 be the (Lebesgue) measure of the set
fi : PJ(i) < pg and Q2 be the measure of the set fi : PJ(i) = pg. Then, the prots
of rm J are not larger than p(Q1 +J(p; 
)Q2) CJ (Q1 + J(p; 
)Q2). Indeed,
a mass of consumers Q1 accept Js o¤er of a price below p, and a mass of consumers
Q2 receive N o¤ers of p, and proportion18 J(p; 
) of these accept rm Js o¤er.
The rest of consumers receive better o¤ers than rm Js o¤er to them so since,
by assumption, the other rms can satisfy all the demand at p they do not buy
from it. Now, note that Q = J(p; 
)D(p) = SJ(p) solves
max
Q
pQ  CJ(Q);
and therefore, p(Q1+J(p; 
)Q2) CJ (Q1 + J(p; 
)Q2)  pSJ(p) CJ (SJ(p)).
Finally, observe that by using the price schedule PJ(i)  p, rm J sells exactly
SJ(p
). Therefore, PJ(i)  p is indeed a best response. Finally, as the consumers
are indi¤erent, they are clearly happy mixing in the prescribed proportions. Note
that the J(i;P;) is indeed measurable.
We now show that there exists no other measurable equilibrium outcome with
pure strategy price schedules. Assume the Law of Large Numbers is satised for a
continuum -in the index i- of independent random variables -on J- with bounded
variance, so that the quantity that rm J sells in the proposed equilibrium is
qJ(P;) =
R
J(i;P;)di almost surely.
Note that forP to be part of an equilibrium it has to be that PJ(i)  C 0J(qJ(P;))
for almost all i such that J(i;P;) > ", for all " > 0. Indeed, otherwise rm J
18By the Law of Large Numbers this proportion is deterministic.
18
could prot by increasing her o¤er (up to, say, PJ(i) = 1) to a positive measure of
these consumers so as not to sell to them. Also, note that qJ(P;) > 0, if (P;)
is an equilibrium. Indeed, consider a small . Since the marginal cost is increasing,
there could be no more than (N   1) consumers that receive a price o¤er below
minJ 0 6=J C 0J 0(") > C
0
J(0) = 0: some producer J
0 would be selling units below marginal
cost and so would prot from withdrawing the corresponding o¤ers. Thus, there are
at least D(minJ 0 6=J C 0J 0()) (N 1) that are willing to pay minJ 0 6=J C 0J 0() > C 0J(0)
and either dont buy or buy at larger prices. Thus, if qJ(P;) = 0, J could gain by
o¤ering a small measure of those consumes a price minJ 0 6=J C 0J 0().
Next, observe that C 0J(qJ(P;)) = C
0
K(qK(P;)) for all J , K. Otherwise, if
C 0J(qJ(P;)) > C
0
K(qK(P;)) then rm K could prot by deviating and making a
(unique winning) o¤er PJ(i)   to some arbitrarily small but positive measure  of
consumers i such that J(i;P;) > " for some (perhaps very small) " > 0, for some
 satisfying (PJ(i)    ) C 0J(qJ(P;))   > C 0K(qK(P;) + ).
Next, we show that, for all " > 0, PJ(i) = C 0J(qJ(P;)) for all J , and for almost
all i such that J(i;P;) > ". Indeed, if PJ(i) > C
0
J(qJ(P;)) = C
0
K(qK(P;)) for a
positive measure of i such that J(i;P;) > ", then rm K could prot by reducing
her price o¤er to PJ(i)   , to a small but positive measure of these consumers
and for a small enough . That would increase the sales of rm K by a positive
measure, at a price above its marginal cost. It follows that in any equilibrium almost
all consumers must buy at the same price in equilibrium. We have left to show that
this price must be the competitive price. That is, we need to show that the total
sales must be equal to the demand at the price common to all transactions. It cannot
be larger, since then some consumers would be buying at a price larger than their
willingness to pay. It cannot be smaller either. Indeed, in such a case a positive
measure of consumers with willingness to pay higher than p = C 0J(qJ(P;)) would
not buy. Some rm could prot by deviating and o¤ering to a small measure of
them a price equal to their willingness to pay (and above its marginal cost).
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